Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise and fall of gurus by Iori, G. & Tedeschi, G.
Iori, G. & Tedeschi, G. (2010). Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise and fall of gurus 
(Report No. 10/05). London, UK: Department of Economics, City University London.
City Research Online
Original citation: Iori, G. & Tedeschi, G. (2010). Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise 
and fall of gurus (Report No. 10/05). London, UK: Department of Economics, City University London.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1487/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
 
Herding Effects in Order Driven Markets: The Rise and Fall of 
Gurus 
 
  
 
 
 
Giulia Iori1 
City University London 
 
Gabriele Tedeschi 
Università Politecnica delle Marche 
  
  
 
Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
No. 10/05
 
2 Department of Economics, City University London, Social Sciences Bldg, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK.  
Email: g.iori@city.ac.uk. T: +44 (0)20 7040 4575 F: +44 (0)20 7040 8580. 
 
 
Herding effects in order driven markets: the
rise and fall of gurus
June 21, 2010
Abstract
We introduce an order driver market model with heterogeneous
traders that imitate each other on a dynamic network structure. The
communication structure evolves endogenously via a fitness mecha-
nism based on agents performance. We assess under which assump-
tions imitation, among otherway noise traders, can give rise to the
emergence of gurus and their rise and fall in popularity over time.
We study the wealth distribution of gurus, followers and non followers
and show that traders have an incentive to imitate and to be imitated
since herding turns out to be profitable.
Keywords: dynamic network, herding, guru, order driver
market.
1 Introduction
Mainstream economic theory does not provide a satisfactory explanation for
financial market frenzies, crashes and panics. The standard reasoning, dat-
ing back to Friedman (1953), is that these phenomena, driven by irrational
traders, are irrelevant in the long run since destabilizing speculators would
quickly go bankrupt and be eliminated from the market. Thus, according
to the mainstream literature, the study of rational speculators is enough to
describe the behaviour of stock markets. Nonethelss there is a considerable
empirical evidence that investors do not always act rationally and do not fol-
low the economists’ advice. Black (1986) suggests that some traders, when
they do not have access to true information, irrationally act on noise, and,
following Kyle (1985), calls such investors ”noise traders”.
The presence of noise traders and their impact on prices’ movement is well
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documented. Some authors (Figlewski (1979), Shiller (1984), Campbell and
Kyle (1987), De Long et al. (1990a)) show that if ’rational agents’ are risk
adverse, then their ability to take positions against noise traders, who drive
prices away from their fundamental value, is limited.
An important mechanism that may explain the deviation of prices from their
fundamental value is the formation of expectations. Expectations drive in-
dividual behaviours and individual behaviours determine the economic out-
come, i.e., prices and trading. ”Therefore, a market, like other social envi-
ronments, may be viewed as an expectations feedback system” (Heemeijer
et al. (2009)). An intuition of how expectations feedback system with ’zero
intelligence agents’1 works is as follows. If noise traders share pessimistic ex-
pectations about an asset, they will sell it frantically, driving down its price.
An informed trader who may want to buy the asset will update his expec-
tations recognizing that in the near future noise traders might become even
more pessimistic and drive price down even further. The informed trader may
eventually conclude that it is not convenient for him to buy now. Conversely,
if the informed trader wants to sell an asset about which noise traders have
optimistic expectations, that would drive the price up, he may decide not
to sell. Thus convergence to the rational equilibrium price becomes unlikely.
In fact, because of the unpredictability of noise traders, prices can fluctuate
significantly even when the fundamental price is stable.
It is generally accepted in the economic works on noise traders that ”posi-
tive feedback” traders prevail in financial markets. Theoretical models and
laboratory experiments of positive feedback2 have been studied (De Long et
al. (1990a), De Long et al. (1990b), Marimon and Sunder (1993), Geber
et al. (2002), Hommes et al. (2005, 2007), Sutan and Willinger (2005) and
Adam (2007)). All these works have shown that positive feedback traders, if
sufficiently aggressive, can destabilize prices.
An important question is why traders’ expectations are often coordinated.
Claude Trichet (2001) remarked: ”Some operators have come to the conclu-
sion that it is better to be wrong along with everybody else, rather than take
the risk of being right or wrong alone”3. This ”mass-uniform” behaviour was
already present in Kaynes (1936) who called it ”animal spirits”.
Some insights into fluctuations in prices and coordination of expectations
1Our market is populated by agents with naive trading strategies, called noise traders.
In this way we are close to the tradition of Zero-Intelligence (ZI) traders as in (Becker
(1962), Gode et al. (1993), Gode et al. (1997).
2Positive feedback in a stock market refer to the situation where positive (negative)
expectations about the price do lead to a price increase (decrease)
3Claude Trichet , then Governor of the Banque de France.
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have been provided by agent-based models. For example Lux and March-
esi (2000), Iori (2002) , Chiarella et al. (2002, 2009), Kirman and Teyssiere
(2002), LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2003), Gaunersdorfer et al. (2008), and LeBaron
et al.(2007, 2009) have analyzed how the co-ordination of traders’ strategies
by market mediated interactions (for example by following chartist trading
rules) or mechanisms of behavioural switching can lead to large aggregate
fluctuations.
Collective behaviour nonetheless could reflects the phenomenon known as
herding which occurs in situations with information externalities, when agents’
private information is swamped by the information derived from directly ob-
serving others’ actions (Bannerjee (1992, 1993); Orle´an (1995); Cont and
Bouchaud (1999), Stauffer and Sornette (1999), Iori (2002), Markose et al.
(2004), LeBaron et al. (2009)). Most of the studies on herding effects have
focused on how herding can lead to large price fluctuation but only a few
papers have investigated its role on the communication network structure
and on traders’ wealth, which is the focus of this paper.
We introduce a model where agents imitate the expectations of the most
successful traders called the Guru4. Price formation is determined by an
order-driven market, as in Chiarella et al. (2009). Within their budget con-
straints, agents can place market orders or limit orders for arbitrary quan-
tities. Limit orders are stored in the book and executed (partially or com-
pletely) when they find a matching market order on the opposite side. A
market order is filled completely if it finds enough capacity on the book, or
partially otherwise. The motivation to use an order-driven market is to avoid
the limitations of the market maker approach in which there is no explicit
mechanism of trading. In fact, the market maker, typically risk neutral and
endowed with unbounded liquidity, absorbs excess demand and makes trad-
ing always viable, regardless of its size. In each period, the market maker
adjusts the price to reduce the excess demand. Inspired by the metaphor of
the Walrasian taˆtonnement, this price-adjusting rule fails to recognize that
in a real market trade occurs whenever two agents can match their requests
at a given price. Because of the simplistic pricing rule adopted by the mar-
ket maker, herding (that normally leads to a large excess demand) has an
obvious and immediate impact on prices.
In an order driven market, where agents imitate the expectations of others
4Agent based models have taken many different approaches as to how strategy infor-
mation could be shared outside price system (see Vriend (2000)).”Obviously, the correct
model for information sharing is not identifiable, but it is clear that some imitation must
take place in financial markets”-Le Baron (2009).
3
and not their action, the role of imitation is less obvious. In fact even if
the guru expects a price increase, he himself and/or the agents that imitate
his expectations may submit limit orders instead of market orders, and the
impact of these trades on the price may be negligible or may be delayed.
In this paper we introduce a model of herding that works as an affective
coordination mechanism of trading actions in limit order markets and has
an impact on prices and the wealth distribution of agents. In our model
all agents are uninformed noise traders and directly imitate each other. The
originality of this work respect to our previous version (Tedeschi et al. (2009))
is in the communication network. In Tedeschi et al. the the guru was fixed
exogenously and each agent decided whether to imitate him or not with a
given probability. Here we introduce an endogenous mechanism of imitation,
by implementing a preferential attachment rule (Baraba´si and Albert (1999))
such that each trader is imitated by others with a probability proportional to
its profit. This mechanism of links formation allows us to study under which
assumptions a gurus endogenously rise and fall over time, and how imitation
affects the asset price and the distribution of agents wealth.
Two models that are related to our are that of Markose et al. (2004) and that
of LeBaron et al (2009). Markose et al. (2004) develop a model where agents
make a binary decision, to buy or sell a single unit of an asset, following the
average advice of the other agents they are connected to. The interaction
network evolves dynamically as agents adaptively modify the weights of their
links to their neighbours by reinforcing ”good” advisors and breaking away
from ”bad” advisors. The question Markose et al. address is whether and
when the dynamic process of reinforced learning can lead to the creation of
small world networks. Nonetheless trading is not explicitly modelled in their
model and the wealth of agents is not monitored.
LeBaron et al. (2009), instead, develop a dynamic limit order model where
traders make weighted forecasts of assets future returns by combining fun-
damental, chartist and noise rules, following Chiarella et al (2009). As time
goes by, agents do trade and look at their own past performances (measured
in term of their expected prices versus realized prices) and update the weights
of their trading rules via a genetic algorithm that selects those parameters
which have performed better. In this model there no direct imitation among
traders and coordination arises when traders dynamically adopt the same
rule.
Although agents in our model initially start with the same amount of stock
and cash, when imitation is high, trading generates a fat tail distribution of
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individuals’ wealth, in accordance with the empirical evidence that market
participants are very heterogeneous in size (see, for example, Pareto (1897),
Zipf (1949), Ijiri and Simon (1977), Axtell (2001), Pushkin and Aref (2004),
Gabaix et al. (2006)). Moreover, in contrast with the prevailing economic
view that informed agents need to hide their private informations in order
to profit from it5 (see Benabou and Laroque (1992), Caldentey and Stac-
chetti (2007), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2008)), our uninformed gurus gain
the highest profits when they reveal their expectations to the highest number
of followers. Furthermore, we will also show that followers, on average, gain
higher profit then non followers, thus providing a justification for herding to
occur in the first place.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the
model; in section 3 we present the results of the simulations; section 4 con-
cludes.
2 The model
2.1 The market
This section describes our market which is based on the order-driven market
used in Chiarella et al. (2009).
A population of N traders can either place market orders, which are im-
mediately executed at the current best listed price, or they can place limit
orders. Limit orders are stored in the exchange’s book and executed using
time priority at a given price and price priority across prices. A transaction
occurs when a market order hits a quote on the opposite side of the market.
Trading happens over a number of periods tk, with k = 1, · · ·T . At the
beginning of each period, traders make expectations about the price at the
end of a given time horizon τ (that we take to be the same for all traders).
The future price expected at time tk + τ by agent i is given by
pˆitk,tk+τ = ptke
rˆitk,tk+τ
√
τ (1)
where rˆitk,tk+τ is the agent’s expectation on the spot return which, as we will
see later, may be affected by the expectation of other agents, and ptk is the
reference price observed by all agents at the beginning of each period. After
5In fact revealing private intentions, specially for large agents, could decrease their
fitness. For this reason large investors refrain from revealing their demand, supply or their
expectation (see Vaglica et al. (2008)).
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expectations are made, agents enter the market, sequentially and in a ran-
dom order and place a buy or a sell order of a certain size. Orders that are
not executed after a period τ are removed from the book.
The number of stocks an agent is willing to hold in its portfolio at a given
price level p depends on the choice of the utility function. Our agents are
modeled as risk averse and maximize an exponential CARA utility function
U(W it , α
i) = −e−αiW it , (2)
where the coefficient αi measures the risk aversion of trader i. We assume
that agents’ risk aversion depends crucially on the expectation formation
mechanism described below. In particular, we assume that those agents who
are highly imitated, and consequently, as we will see later, are more successful
are less risk averse than agents who have no impact on the expectations of
others. This effect is captured by setting
αitk = α(1− (1− w)l%i,tk) (3)
where α is some reference level of risk aversion, l%i,tk is the percentage of
existing links that point to agent i at time tk and w measures the impact
that agent j’s expectation has on the agent i’s expectation: smaller is w,
higher is this impact.
We next define the portfolio wealth of each agent as
W it = S
i
tpt + C
i
t , (4)
where Sit ≥ 0 and Cit ≥ 0 are respectively the stock and cash position of agent
i at time t. The optimal composition of the agent’s portfolio is determined in
the usual way by trading-off expected return against expected risk. However
here the agents are not allowed to engage in short-selling. When agents
place a market order, their cash and stocks positions are updated accordingly.
When agents place a limit order, the cash they commit to buy and the stocks
they commit to sell are tentatively removed from their portfolios (even if a
limit order does not comport an immediate transaction). In this way agents
can not spend money or sell stocks that have already been committed in the
book. If an order is cancelled, the stocks and cash that were tied down in
the order are returned to the trader who had submitted it.
For the CARA utility function assumed here the optimal composition of the
portfolio, that is the number of stocks the agent wishes to hold at any given
time is given by
pii(p) =
ln(pˆit+τ/p)
αiV it p
, (5)
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where V it is the variance of returns expected by agent i
6. If the amount pii(p)
is larger (smaller) than the number of stocks already in the portfolio of agent
i then the agent decides to buy (sell). Agents estimate V it as
V it =
1
τ
τ∑
j=1
[rt−j − r¯it]2, (6)
where the average spot return r¯it is given by
r¯it =
1
τ
τ∑
j=1
rt−j =
1
τ
τ∑
j=1
ln
pt−j
pt−j−1
, (7)
In order to determine the buy/sell price range of a typical agent, we first
estimate numerically the price level p∗ at which agents are satisfied with the
composition of their current portfolio, which is determined by
pii(p∗) =
ln(pˆit+τ/p
∗)
αiV it p
∗ = S
i
t . (8)
Eq. (8) admits a unique solution with 0 < p∗ ≤ pˆit+τ since Sit ≥ 0 (short
selling is not allowed). Agents are willing to buy at any price p < p∗ since in
this price range their demand is greater than their holding, and are willing
to sell at any price p > p∗ since in this case their demand is less than their
holding. Note that agents may thus wish to sell even if they expect a future
price increase. In order to impose budget constraints we need to restrict to
values of p ≤ pˆit+τ = piM to ensure pi(p) ≥ 0 and so rule out short selling.
Furthermore to ensure that an agent i has sufficient cash to purchase the
desired stocks, the smallest value of p we can allow, pim, is determined by its
cash position (see Eq. (4)), and is given by the condition
pim
(
pii(pim)− Sit
)
= Cit . (9)
Again one can easily show that this equation also admits a unique solution
with 0 < pim ≤ pˆit+τ since Sit , Cit ≥ 0. Indeed, comparing Eqs. (8) and (9) it
can be easily proven that 0 < pim ≤ p∗ ≤ pˆit+τ . Having determined that the
possible values at which an agent can satisfactorily trade are in the interval
[pim, p
i
M ], we next consider how the nature of the agent’s order is determined.
Suppose now that the agent chooses to trade at a price p < p∗, then it
submits a limit order to buy an amount
si = pii(p)− Sit ,
6Eq. (5) can be derived on the basis of mean-variance one-period portfolio optimization
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Position Type of order Volume
pim < p < a
q
t BUY Limit order si = pi
i(p)− Sit
aqt ≤ p < p∗ BUY Market order si = pii(aqt )− Sit
p = p∗ No order placement
p∗ < p ≤ bqt SELL Market order si = Sit − pii(bqt )
bqt < p ≤ piM SELL Limit order si = Sit − pii(p)
Table 1: Summary of the trading mechanism of a typical trader i with a
random price level p limited between the value pim given by Eq. (9) and the
value piM = pˆ
i
t+τ i . The current quoted best ask and best bid are a
q
t and b
q
t
respectively.
while if p > p∗ it submits a limit order to sell an amount
si = Si − pii(p).
However if p < p∗ and p > aqt the buy order can be executed immediately
at the ask. An agent in this case would submit a market order to buy an
amount
si = pii(aqt )− Sit .
Similarly if p > p∗ and p < bqt the agent would submit a market order to sell
an amount
si = Sit − pii(bqt ).
If the depth at the bid (ask) is not enough to fully satisfy the order, the
remaining volume is executed against limit orders in the book. The agent
thus takes the next best buy (sell) order and repeats this operation as many
times as necessary until the order is fully executed. This mechanism applies
under the condition that sufficient quotes of these orders are above (below)
price p. Otherwise, the remaining volume is converted into a limit order at
price p. If the limit order is still unmatched at time t+ τ it is removed from
the book.
The essential details of the trading mechanism are summarized in Table 1,
showing how it depends on the price level p, the “satisfaction level” p∗, the
best ask aqt and the best bid b
q
t .
2.2 The network
To model how agents’ decision are influenced by their mutual interaction
we introduce a communication structure in which nodes represents agents
8
and the hedges are the connective links between them. Links are directional
and go from the agent that requests advice to the agent that provides advice.
In general local interaction models agent interacts directly with a finite num-
ber of others in the population. The set of nodes with whom a node is linked
is referred to as its neighbourhoods. In our model the number of out-going
links is constrained to be one. The reason being that in a highly connected
random network synchronisation could be achieved via indirect links. The
effects of direct imitation are easier to be tested in a diluted network where
indirect synchronisation is less likely to arise.
We implement an endogenous mechanism of preferential attachment based
on a fitness parameter given by agent’s wealth. Agents start with the same
amount of cash Ct=0 and stocks St=0, so that all agents have the same initial
wealth Wt=0 = Ct=0 + pt=0St=0. As time goes by, some traders may become
richer than others. As a measure of agents’ success we define their fitness at
time t as their wealth relative to the wealth Wmaxt of the richest agent imax:
f it =
W it
Wmaxt
. (10)
Each agent i starts with one outgoing link with a random agent j, and
possibly with some incoming links from other agents. Links are rewinded
at the beginning of each period, in the following way: each agent i cuts his
outgoing link, with agent k, and forms a new link, with a randomly chosen
agent j, with a probability
pr =
1
1 + e−βi(f
j
t−fkt )
The rewind algorithm is designed so that successful traders, here called
gurus, gain a higher number of incoming links and thus have a higher prob-
ability of being imitated. Nonetheless the algorithm introduces a certain
amount of randomness, and links with more successful agent have a finite
probability to be cut in favour of links with less successful agents. In this
way we model imperfect information and bounded rationality of agents. The
randomness also helps unlocking the system from the situation where all
agents link to the same guru.
2.3 The expectation formation mechanism
At the beginning of each trading period tk, agents make idiosyncratic expec-
tations about the spot return, rˆitk,tk+τ in the interval (tk, tk + τ). We assume
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that agents are not informed and have random expectation of future returns.
We also assume that agents are heterogeneous in that they have different
forecasts of the returns’ volatility, σit. Expected returns are thus given by
rˆitk,tk+τ = σ
i
tk
tk (11)
where σitk is a positive, agent specific, constant and t ∼ N(0, 1) is a normal
noise.
After individual expectation are generated, a consultation round starts dur-
ing which agents sequentially, and in a random order, revise their expec-
tation. The revised expected return is obtained by weighing agent i’s own
expectation with that of agent j to which i is linked to
ritk,tk+τ = wrˆ
i
tk,tk+τ
+ (1− w)rˆjtk,tk+τ . (12)
When w is equal to zero, i trusts completely the opinions of j, while when w
is equal to one i considers exclusively his own opinion and agents decisions
are fully independent from each other. At the end of each period tk, after
trading has taken place, agents expectations are reset to random values. We
stress that in the model imitation is purely expectation based, and agents do
not observe the actions of others. This choice is motivated by the fact that
in a real market the order book is not normally fully visible to traders, and
that the order submission is anonymous.
While our agents are noise traders, we assume that they correctly antici-
pate the impact of herding on asset prices. In particular if an agent has
several incoming links, and w is small (in which case the agent expects to be
able to influence the decisions of others), he forecast a larger price volatility.
This is incorporated in the model by assuming that the volatility of returns
is proportional to the number of incoming links and to the weights w, such
that
σitk = σ
i
0(A+ l
%
i,tk
(1− w)) (13)
where l%i,tk in the percentage of existing links that point to agent i at time tk
and A is a constant parameter. The values of σi0 are chosen, with uniform
probability, in the interval (0, σ0).
3 Simulations and results
The model is studied numerically for different values of the parameter w. In
the first part we focus the analysis on some properties of the network such
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as the in-degree and fitness distribution. Then we analyze the probability
distribution of wealth and stocks and the positive feedback on prices.
In the simulations the number of traders is set at N = 150. Each agent is
initially given the same amount of stock S0 = 100 and cash C0 = 100. The
initial stock price is chosen at p0 = 1000. We fix τ = 200, α = 0.01, and β
i
uniformly distributed in the interval [5, 45] The results reported here are the
outcome of simulations of T = 1000 periods and Nt = 300 trades per period.
Simulations are repeated M = 100 times with a different random seed7
3.1 The network
In figure (1) we plot one shot of the configuration of the endogenous network
for w = 0.1, w = 0.5 and w = 1.0. The graphs show that few gurus could
co-exist and compete for popularity. As w increases the network becomes
less and less centralized with a higher number of smaller gurus. Moreover
Figure 1: Network configuration for w = 0.1 (the guru is agent 108) (left
side), for w = 0.5 (the guru is agent 78) (centre) and for w = 1 (the guru is
agent 6) (right side).
the topology of the network is different from that of the random graph stud-
ied extensively by Erdos and Renyi (1960). While in an Erdos-Reny random
graph the in-degree8 has a Binomial (or Poisson) distribution, in real world
7We have tested the stability of our results and verified that the model shows a quali-
tatively similar behaviour for a range of values of the parameters.
8In directed graphs, there is the in-degree, number of edges pointed to it, and out-
degree, number of edges pointing away from it. Note, the out-degree of an agent defined
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networks some agents are found to have a disproportionately large number
of incoming links while others have very few. In figure. (2) we plot the com-
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Figure 2: The complementary cumulative distribution (CCD) of the nor-
malized in-degree (left side) and the complementary cumulative distribution
(CCD) of the normalized fitness (right side) for w = 0.1 (black line), w = 0.5
(red line) and w = 1.0 (green line).
plementary cumulative distribution (CCD) of the normalized in-degree (left
side) and the complementary cumulative distribution (CCD) of the normal-
ized fitness (right side) for w = 0.1 (black line), w = 0.5 (red line) and
w = 1.0 (green line). The distribution of in degree in our model, when imi-
tation is large, is in keeping with that of scale-free networks and displays a
’fat tail’.
In figure (3) we plot the index of the current guru (black), the percentage
of incoming link to the current guru (red) and the fitness of the current guru
(green), for different w, as function of the time. The figure shows that agents
alternate as the guru during the simulation (black line). In fact, as the guru
acquires an increasing number of links (red line), one or more of his followers
may become richer than the guru himself, as signalled by the fact that the
fitness (green line) of the guru becomes, at times, smaller than 1. As other
agents become rich they start to be imitated more and more and eventually
one of them becomes the new guru.
by those edges starting from i gives the number of his first order neighbours that, in our
model, are constrained to be one.
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The stability (or average life) of the guru becomes longer as imitation
increases as shown in figure (4).
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Figure 3: The index of current guru(black), the percentage of incoming link
to current guru (red) and fitness of current guru(green) for w = 0.1 (left
side), w = 0.5 (centre) and w = 1 (right side).
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Figure 4: Average Guru’s live as a function of w.
3.2 Wealth analysis
In figure. (5) we compare the different performances, in terms of wealth, of
the guru (black line), his direct followers (red line) and the rest of the traders
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Figure 5: Wealth time series of guru (black line), followers (red line) and
rest of the system (green line) for w = 0.1 (left side), w = 0.5 (center) and
w = 1.0 (right side).
(green line) for the same parameters as in figure (3). Comparing figure (5)
and figure (3) we observe that the wealth of the guru increases with w and
that the gap between the wealth of the guru and the wealth of the rest of the
system (both followers and non followers) widens with the level of imitation.
This result is better quantified by figure (6) that shows the average wealth,
over all times and all simulations, of the gurus (black line), followers (red
line) and rest of the system (green line) as a function of w.
Figure. (7) shows how, raising imitation, the model generates heterogene-
ity, as indicated by the fat tail distribution of agents’ wealth and stock.
3.3 Prices Analysis
Figure. (8) shows prices (black lines) and average expected prices (red lines)
for w = 0.1, w = 0.5 and w = 1.0. We can immediately notice that coordi-
nation causes wider excursions of price movement. Further, we observe that
prices and expected prices follow each other closely when w is small.
To better quantify this observation we calculate the mean price deviation
between realized prices and expected prices defined as |ptk−pˆ
i
tk
ptk
|, and average
it over time and the number of simulations. As figure (9) shows this devia-
tion is smaller when imitation is high. This result is consistent with the fact
that herding generates positive feedback.
Positive feedback has several implications on the correlation between as-
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Figure 6: Average wealth, over all times and all simulations, of the guru
(black line), followers (red line) and rest of the system (green line).
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Figure 7: The decumulative distribution function (DDF) of the wealth (left
side) and the decumulative distribution function (DDF) of the stocks (right
side) for w = 0.1 (black line), w = 0.5 (red line) and w = 1.0 (green line).
set price behaviour and traders’ action. In particular, experimental investi-
gations and theoretical models (see De Long et al. (1989), Hommes et al.
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Figure 8: Prices (black line) and average expected prices (red line) with
w=0.1 (left), w=0.5 (center) and w=1.0 (right).
(2003), Heemeijer et al. (2007)) show that, when noise traders follow positive
feedback strategies, they buy when prices increase and sell when prices fall.
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Figure 9: Deviation between realized prices and expected prices as a function
of w
A natural way to assess the co-movement between the increase (decrease) in
prices and increase (decrease) in purchase orders is to study their correlation.
Figure. (10) shows that such correlation coefficient9 is an decreasing function
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Figure 10: Average correlation coefficient between positive price changes and
number of buyers as a function of w.
of w and reaches a value above 0.8 when imitation is significant, confirming
the presence of a positive feedback.
3.4 Discussion
To explain the above results we first need to show that the imitation of
expectations translates into imitation of trading actions. An expected price
increase (decrease) in our model does not necessarily lead to a decision to
buy and, even if so, buy order could be submitted as limit orders. Market
orders are more likely to be submitted when agents are very optimistic or
pessimistic. In fact in this case the interval [pm, pM ] over which orders can be
placed is wider and it becomes more likely that a price level is chosen such
that the order can be immediately executed. In our model it is the agents
with many incoming links who forecast a high volatility σit (via equation 13)
and are more likely to submit market orders. In addition, if a popular agent
has enough connections it can influence several others to overestimate price
changes and submit market orders in turns.
In figure. (11) we plot the average fraction of the volume of market orders
9We have investigated correlation using the Person correlation coefficient significant at
1% level.
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to buy or sell, over the total volume of orders in the same direction. The
average is taken over each trading period and plotted for different values of w.
The result shows, as anticipated, that, when increasing imitation, a higher
fraction of market orders is submitted. Thus the coordination of expectation
leads to a coordination of actions and the model generates an expectations
feedback system.
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Figure 11: Average fraction of the volume of market orders to sell(left) buy
(right) over the total volume of orders in the same direction for different
value of w.
In turn, a series of market orders in the same direction can generate con-
siderable price changes, as shown by figure12. Thus, the forecasts from highly
connected agents of an overall high volatility are self-fulfilling, providing an
ex-post justification for equation (13).
Next we explain the distribution of agents’ wealth and stocks. First of all,
as long as the guru is not the last to trade (we assume a random entrance
to the market for all agents including the guru) he will consistently gain on
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Figure 12: Mean and variance of returns as a function of w.
the trades that follow, in the same direction, his trade. Furthermore, while
agents are risk adverse, highly connected agents underestimate risk, accord-
ing to equation 3. Consequently these traders, when w is small and their
percentage of incoming links, l%, is high, invest more (on average) in the
risky asset than others, as confirmed by figure. (13). Followers in turn invest
on average more than non followers because they, like the guru, overestimate
returns. By investing more, gurus and followers earn, on average, higher
profits than no followers (as was shown in figure.6).
These results are in line with other studies on noise traders risk with positive
feedback in financial markets. Particularly, De Long et al. (1990a) show that
noise traders can earn higher returns solely by bearing more of the risk that
they themselves create10. Our results are in line with previous studies(see
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985), Heemeijer et al. (2007)) and confirm that
traders have an incentive to imitate and be imitated, since predicting a price
close to the predictions of other players turns out to be most profitable.
10An example of this phenomenon, known under the name of market manipulation, is
the ’pool’ in RCA stock operated by Michael Meehan between March 7 and March 22,
1929. (see De Long et al. (1990b))
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Figure 13: Mean size of orders of the guru(black) and the rest of he system
(red) as a function of w.
4 Conclusion
Our results result allows us to conclude that profit is a good mechanism of
links formation, and able to generate the famous Matthew effect11. The en-
dogenous attachment mechanism introduced in our model allows a guru to
emerge spontaneously in the system, rise and fall in popularity over time,
and possibly be replaced by a new guru. A few gurus could also co-exist and
compete among themselves for popularity. Nonetheless, for the endogenous
attachment mechanism to be capable of creating, sustaining and destroying
a guru, agents need to benefit from imitating and being imitated. In fact,
if an agent profits from being imitated, he becomes richer, which induces an
even larger fraction of agents points to him. Nonetheless, if only the agents
who are imitated benefit from imitation, once an agent becomes the guru he
11In 1955 Herbert Simon showed that power laws arise when ’the rich get richer’, when
the amount you get goes up with the amount you already have. In sociology this is referred
to as Matthew effect (see Merton (1968)) with reference to the biblical edict. Today,
this phenomenon is usually known under the name ’preferential attachment’, coined by
Barabasi and Albert (1999). Bianconi and Barabasi (2001) have proposed an extension
of Barabasi and Albert. In their model each newly appearing vertex i is given a ’fitness’
that represents its attractiveness and thus its propensity to gain more links. When one
considers a fitness algorithm it is true that the larger the fitness the larger the degree but
a large degree is a consequence of some intrinsic quality, not the cause of the improvement
of site connectivity. In our model this intrinsic quality is, precisely, the agents’ profit.
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would remain the guru for ever. On the other side, if followers also profit
from imitating the guru, their could eventually over-performe the guru, and
become guru in turn.
The fact that our unsophisticated investors, trivially driven by imitative be-
haviour, can earn very high profits implies that Friedman’s hypothesis is
inadequate. The assumption that noise traders quickly go bankrupt and are
eliminated from the market is unrealistic in presence of herding and posi-
tive feedback. In fact we have shown that noise traders can earn very high
profits and cause large price fluctuations. These results should not be under-
estimated, particularly in those situations when market prices exhibit large
fluctuation. In these cases in fact is unlikely that prices incorporate true
information and the idea of full rationality is implausible.
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